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1. Introduction
We are concerned in this paper with the emergence of new technologies commonly
referred to as Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS)
1
and in particular with the `styl-
ized fact' that Japan seems to be investing in such technologies almost four times more
than the United States per dollar of GNP. According to Tchijov (1992), Japan has about
24% of FMS in operation around the world and the United States 16%; the ratio of the
Japanese GNP over the American GNP is about 40%. The FMS production systems be-
ing adopted at an increasing rate throughout the world have the following main economic
characteristics: they require a relatively higher investment cost than conventional tech-
nologies but they allow for signicant reductions in setup costs allowing more product
exibility and more volume exibility (reduced minimum production runs), in lead time,
in unit variable cost, in average batch size.
2
These new technologies are likely to lead
not only to very dierent competitive environments but also to signicant modications
of growth patterns.
3
FMS are indeed changing dramatically the production process and
1
They are also referred to as Computer Controlled (or Integrated) Manufacturing CAM/CIM.
2
On the basis of the relatively restrictive criteria of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
in Austria (see Tchijov 1992), there were in 1989 about 800 FMS in operation in 26 countries: among
others, Japan has about 24% of those, the United States 16%, the U.K. 11%, France 9.7% and Canada
0.5%; in terms of number of products, 30% of those FMS are used to produce no more than 10 products,
48% between 11 and 100, 19% between 100 and 1000, and 3% are used to produce over 1000 products;
in terms of batch size, 32% are used to produce batches which are on average smaller than 10 units, 34%
between 11 and 50, 29% between 50 and 1000, and 5% for batches of over 1000 units on average. Prudent
estimates indicate that the introduction of a FMS has allowed an average reduction in lead time (lag
between order and delivery) by a factor of 2 to 3, an average reduction in set-up time (the time spent to
reset the equipment for a product change) by a factor of 10, an average reduction in personnel by a factor
of 2 to 3, and a reduction in unit cost by a factor of 1.25 to 1.5. More recent developments in FMS increase
those factors. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) provide other examples of the impact of the adoption of these
modern technologies: a survey of the aerospace and other high precision industries revealed that 8.2% of
all batches were of size 1 and 38% of size 16 and less; an Allen-Bradley plant producing electric controls
can now switch production among its 725 products with an average set-up time of 6 seconds and it usually
lls orders the day after they are received and ships products the same day by air express; General Motors
engineers could in 1988 set a plant equipment to produce pilots of the 1989 models during the weekend
and reset the equipment in time for the Monday morning production of the 1988 models while the same
operation used to take weeks; General Electric has reduced the lead time for circuit-breaker boxes from
three weeks to three days, which allowed a reduction in back orders from 60 days to 2 days; Carterpillar's
modernization program has been accompanied by a doubling of its product line.
3
See Boyer (1991): Growth patterns in the future are likely to be based an a better matching between
products and preferences rather than on more units per capita because of the relative shift from economies
1
the internal organization of rms as well as their market environment and their rela-
tions with suppliers and customers. Given the major changes that a FMS represents,
the evaluation process of such investments has been less than well understood by the
engineering, nance and accounting personnel of the typical rm.
4
The main diculties
in evaluating FMS projects revolve around the proper identication of the determinants
of the value of more exibility, of better quality control and better product reliability
and of reduced lead time in production, incorporating in particular the value of organiza-
tional (incentives) restructuring possibilities, and the value the strategic advantages (and
disadvantages) of an investment in FMS. A leitmotif of the engineering literature on the
subject is that this state of aairs generates a bias towards rejecting such investments
because major potentially favorable elements are either misunderstood or simply left out
in the protability evaluation, in particular the strategic impact of more exibility and
the change in the rm's cost of capital and capital structure.
5
Dierent theories or models have been proposed to explain, more or less convincingly
and more or less directly, the above `stylized fact' regarding the relative FMS investment
levels in Japan and the United States.
6
In one such model, the working of nancial
markets diers in such a way that the level of monitoring of entrepreneurs by nanciers
is higher in Japan; given the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard features
in nancial markets, this allows for a lower cost of capital in Japan; since technological
investments in FMS are typically long term investments, the model predicts that the
level of such investments will be relatively larger in Japan. A related model makes the
of scale towards economies of scope allowed by FMS. Eaton and Schmitt (1993) have shown that this switch
from scale to scope has also important implications for market structure and competition policy.
4
For quick but convincing overviews of the problems, see Gerwin (1982), Lederer and Singhal (1988) who
provide an extensive list of references to the engineering literature, and Mensah and Miranti (1989).
5
Although this paper is a paper on technological exibility, much of its content can be applied mutatis
mutandis to organizational exibility. Similarly, the negotiation strategy of brinkmanship, when feasible,
can be understood as evolving from a relatively exible position to positions which become \in a credible
way" more and more inexible.
6
Some of those were not developed with reference to the above `stylized' fact but they may be reinterpreted
in this context.
2
case that for cultural reasons Japanese managers and stockholders take a longer run ap-
proach (longer payback periods) in evaluating technological investments; since many of
the benets of FMS are long term benets, the prediction follows. A third model rests
on the belief or fact that successful investments in FMS require not only a concerted
organizational transformation of the rm itself but also coordinated technological invest-
ments and organizational changes by suppliers and by clients; since this coordination is
more easily reached in the well integrated Japanese industrial groups, the keiretsus using
a kanban system,
7
than in the more loosely integrated American industrial clusters, the
model predicts larger FMS investments in Japan.
Our results suggest a dierent explanation based on the strategic interactions between
the rms combined with the specic characteristics of an industry. Given that technology
decisions are typically longer term decisions than production ones, we propose a two stage
duopoly model in which rms choose in stage one their respective levels of technological
exibility and choose in stage two their production levels. We show that there exist very
reasonable cases, which we characterize, in which the Nash equilibrium in technology is
asymmetric, one rm being exible and the other inexible, even if both rms are com-
pletely symmetric: they have the same information and the same nancial, cultural and
coordination possibilities. We also show that there exist very reasonable cases, which we
characterize, for which the rms suers in equilibrium from too much exibility: they
experience a exibility trap, a form of prisoner dilemma situation. We then introduce a
variant of the above model by assuming that the long term technology choices are made
sequentially with the second-mover (follower) rm observing the rst-mover's (leader)
choice before deciding on its own technology. We characterize the conditions or industry
characteristics under which dierent asymmetric equilibrium congurations will emerge:
a (f; i)-conguration with the rst-mover exible (f) and the second-mover inexible
(i) or a (i; f)-conguration. The stylized observation that Japanese are investing sig-
7
See Aoki (1988), pp. 208{223.
3
nicantly more in FMS than the Americans is consistent with the following assertion:
American rms have typically been the rst-movers in industries whose characteristics
are such that the industry equilibrium is of the (i; f) type while the Japanese rms have
typically been the rst-movers in industries whose characteristics are such that the in-
dustry equilibrium is of the (f; i) type. We show also that being the rst-mover is at
least as protable as being the second-mover. It follows that the relative positioning of
the Japanese and American rms in dierent industries could explain the above `stylized
fact' in the absence of dierent levels of managers' rationality or competence, dierent
capital markets or dierent information structures.
Our results lead also to the following predictions. In both the Nash and the Stack-
elberg market structures, the value of exibility for a given rm increases with market
volatility ; it also increases eventually (not always) with increases in the size of the
market . However, the eects of those exogenous changes on the equilibrium techno-
logical conguration in an industry may dier signicantly from their eect at the rm's
level. In some particular contexts which we do characterize, an increase in market size
may induce a rm to switch from a exible technology to an inexible one because the
increased market size will in some contexts increase the commitment value of inexibil-
ity. In some Stackelberg contexts which we also characterize, an increase in market size
or in demand volatility will induce the two rms to trade their technological exibility
level; this surprising result is directly due to the strategic interactions between the rms.
Moreover, increases in exogenous competitive pressures, measured either as an increase
in demand elasticity or as a decrease in the minimum eciency scale of production, will
induce rms to switch, one at a time, from an inexible technology to a exible one.
In general the leader will adopt the exible technology rst but again there are cases
where it is the follower who adopts it rst; in those latter cases, a further increase in
competitive pressures will induce the rms to trade their technologies, from (i; f) to
(f; i), before further increases make it protable again for the follower to adopt a exible
4
technology ! Again, this surprising result is directly due to the strategic interactions
between the rms. Finally, we show that the impact of a reduction in the investment
cost of exible technologies is favorable to the adoption of those technologies but that
its specic impact on the probability of observing asymmetric equilibria (f; i) and (i; f)
depends on the distribution of industries in (; )-space.
Although the literature on technological exibility is rather large and covers many
elds from engineering, operations research, optimal control and production management
to economics and game theory, few authors have explicitly considered and studied the
strategic aspects of technological exibility choices and nobody, to our knowledge, has
directly tried to explain in an explicit model of strategic behavior the `stylized' fact at
the root of the present paper. See Kulitilaka and Marks (1988), Vives (1989), Roller and
Tombak (1990, 1993), Fine and Pappu (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Gerwin
(1993) for the more signicant contributions. The papers more related to the present one
are those of Roller and Tombak (1990, 1993) and Fine and Pappu (1990). Those authors
have attempted to model technological choices in an explicit strategic competition con-
text. Roller and Tombak (1990) consider product exibility in a dierentiated product
model in which rms move simultaneously in choosing under perfect information (no un-
certainty) their respective technology and output. Two types of technologies are feasible,
a dedicated technology which can be used to produce a single product and a exible
technology which can be used to produce multiple products. They characterize the sub-
game perfect equilibria and show that exible technologies are more valuable the larger
the size of the market is, the smaller the dierential investment cost is between a exi-
ble and an inexible technology, and the more dierentiated the products are.
8
In that
8
The last eect may be interpreted as follows: consider a rm with a dedicated technology in market A;
if products A and B are relatively bad substitutes, the rm may switch to a exible technology allowing
it to enter into market B, therefore increasing competition in B, without aecting too much the market
conditions in A; if the products are relatively good substitutes, the increased competition in market B will
reduce the possible prots in market A. This is likely to develop into a prisoner dilemma kind of situation
for the rms in the industry and therefore lead to the emergence of inecient equilibria with too much
investment in exible technologies.
5
context, exible technologies are never adopted if the products are perfect substitutes;
but casual observation of markets or industries in which FMS investments have been un-
dertaken indicates that many of those markets and industries are quite competitive with
relatively similar product lines (for instance electronics, machine tools, heavy machin-
ery). By introducing uncertainty in demand, we will characterize the subgame perfect
equilibria with homogeneous products in which exible technologies are present and play
a major strategic role. Roller and Tombak (1993) show that a larger proportion of FMS
rms in an industry is associated with more concentrated markets, larger markets and
more dierentiated products, results supported by an econometric analysis of Japanese
and American data. Fine and Pappu (1990) consider retaliatory punishment strategies
which rms can deploy when a competitor enters their home market. These strategies
are made \credible" by investing in product-exible technologies. Clearly, the existence
of such technologies may increase competition and reduce the rms' prots unless puni-
tive strategies can be enforced (in a repeated game fashion): the rms may be caught
in a prisoner dilemma situation and therefore could be better o without those exible
technologies. We will develop a model with two stage non repeated competition with
volume-exible technologies, show the existence of a exibility trap and characterize the
whole map of technological exibility equilibria as a function of industry characteristics.
More exibility means in our model a reduction in set{up costs, in minimum produc-
tion runs, in inventories, in variable production costs at all production levels, speedier
adjustments to changing market conditions (modeled through a random market demand),
but requires a higher investment cost. We take also into account that in a strategic con-
text, more exibilitymay come at the expense of a commitment and preemption strategy
whose credibility could rely on the inexibility to adapt to changing market conditions.
We analyze the balancing act between the two strategies and determine the factors which
will tilt the balance one way or another. Our results show quite clearly that a decision
on technological exibility has not only decision-theoretic aspects but also important
6
strategic aspects.
9
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the basic model and we
discuss the related literature on the subject. Section 3 is devoted to the characterization
of the best reply functions to exibility and inexibility. We characterize in section 4
both the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and perform some comparative statics exercises
on the impact of dierent changes in the industry parameters on the nature of the
equilibrium. In section 5, we look at technological exibility and inexibility as means
to deter entry when such deterrence is possible. In the conclusion, we come back to the
stylized fact mentioned at the beginning and discuss the empirical implications of our
results, both the lessons learned and the predictions made.
2. A Model of Technological Flexibility
In the spirit of Stigler (1939),
10
let us characterize a technology by the two param-
eters (; x), where  represents the degree of inexibility and x is the level of capacity
(average cost minimizing production level). The strategic value of technological exi-
bility comes from the possibility of inuencing the behavior and choices of competitors,
including eventually the decision to enter or not. We consider a duopoly (possibly with
a competitive fringe), the simplest possible framework in which such strategic consider-
9
Technological exibility is quite dierent from another concept of exibility which we may call exibility
in timing. In the latter context, an agent remains exible by postponing a decision in order to benet from
improved information over time. The strategic aspect of such exibility in timing refers to two dierent
phenomena. First, to the irreversibility occurring when a decision, taken with less than full information,
nevertheless commits an agent or a society to an irreversible future set of actions (see Henry 1974 and Freixas
and Laont 1984). Second, to the relative value of commitment versus exibility, the former corresponding
to a decision taken before the uncertainty is levied and the latter to a decision taken after the resolution of
uncertainty (see Spencer and Brander 1992, Sadanand and Green 1993). The present paper is somewhat
related to the latter strand of the literature on exibility in timing insofar as we consider at least implicitly
the value of the commitment associated with inexibility versus the value of easier adaptation to changing
markets with exibility.
10
George Stigler pioneered in his 1939 article the analysis of technological or cost exibility. He stated that
rms in general have to make a choice among dierent equipment giving rise to dierent cost congurations,
for example a cost function which has a relatively wide at bottom and a cost function which can attain a
lower minimum average cost at the expense of steeply rising average cost as production moves away from
the most ecient scale of production. See Boyer and Moreaux (1989) for a review of the general denitions
of exibility proposed by Stigler (1939), Marshak and Nelson (1962) and Jones and Ostroy (1984).
7
ations can be analyzed and also the competitive setting which is the most conducive to
strategic interactions. To concentrate on these strategic aspects, we will assume that the
level of capacity is exogenous. To make those strategic aspects as explicit as possible,
we will consider two dierent market structures: a Nash setting in which the long run
technological choices are made simultaneously and a Stackelberg setting in which they
are made sequentially with the second-mover rm choosing its technology after observing
the choice of the rst-mover rm. In both cases, the short run decisions on production
will be assumed to be made simultaneously once technological choices are determined
and observed by both rms. Hence we have in mind a two stage model:
{ long run stage 1: rms choose simultaneously or sequentially their technologies
{ short run stage 2: rms choose simultaneously their marketed quantities.
This two stage formulation will in general give rise to multiple equilibria in stage
2 and discontinuities in prot functions; this reects important underlying phenomena
(shut-down of production, bankruptcy, etc.) but makes the analysis more intricate and
the results, obtainable by numerical simulations, less intuitive. As a step towards avoiding
those diculties but without missing the basic intuitions and results on the exibility
versus inexibility technological choice problem, we will assume in this paper that the
rms can only choose between two levels of exibility, either perfect exibility ( = f)
or perfect inexibility ( = i). Let us explain what we mean by these two extreme
possibilities.
The choice between a exible technology and an inexible technology rests in part
on eciency or cost-wise considerations and in part on strategic considerations. We
can identify the fundamental cost-wise dierences between exibility and inexibility
as follows: exible technologies require a larger investment cost; inexible technologies
are more ecient (lower average variable cost) for production levels close to capacity;
exible technologies have a lower set-up cost incurred when a new production run starts.
In order to fully incorporate the important dierences in terms of production costs and
8
to stress the commitment advantage an inexible technology may confer, we will model
an inexible production process as a process which can be operated at a given xed level
(at capacity) to produce a given xed quantity q = x which is then sold by the rm.
11
The cost-wise trade-o between choosing a maximal exibility level  = f and choosing
a maximal inexibility level  = i is captured by the following three characteristics which
we will assume for the cost function. First, the investment cost H of a exible technology
is larger than that of an inexible technology, the latter being set at 0. Second, a exible
technology has no set-up cost and a constant marginal cost of production c while an
inexible technology has a set-up cost equal to sx and an average direct cost of production
equal to 0 for q 2 f0; xg but innite otherwise. We will assume for matter of simplicity
that both technologies attain the same minimum average variable cost, that is c = s.
Hence:
H(i) = 0 and H(f) = H > 0
C(q) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
cq if  = f
0 if  = i and q = 0
sx if  = i and q = x
1 if  = i and q =2 f0; xg
c = s.
We will assume that the rms produce an homogeneous product and that the demand
is linear.
p = maxf0;   (q
L
+ q
F
)g.
Our model is therefore a model of volume exibility rather than product exibility; but
the two are intimately related through the reduced xed cost which FMS implies. We
will assume that there is uncertainty in demand in the following sense:
12
although 
11
Admittedly, this is an extreme assumption. It can be relaxed in dierent ways (see Boyer and Moreaux
1995) at the cost of blurring the argumentation but the main thrust of the results remains valid. For a
study along these lines, see Lecostey (1994).
12
If x were chosen endogenously, exibility would be useless in the absence of some variability (either in the
form of seasonal patterns in demand or of genuine uncertainty) in demand because rms would choose a
9
is assumed to be known with certainty, the parameter  (a measure of the size of the
market) is assumed to be a random variable with probability distribution function F ()
known by both rms:
 2 [;], with variance V and mean .
To stress even more the strategic character of technological exibility choices, we will
assume that the value of  becomes known at the beginning of every short run production
period; in other words, the uncertainty of demand is levied after the long run decisions
but before the short run decisions. The two rms, assumed to be risk neutral, will choose
their exibility levels to maximize their expected prots.
The relative advantages and disadvantages of exibility and inexibility stem here
from three elements: rst, a exible technology i requires a larger investment outlay;
second, exibility allows for an easier adaptation to changing levels of demand; third,
inexibility has a commitment value insofar as it means a smaller interval (a singleton
here) in which the rm will select its quantity produced in stage 2, if it produces at all.
In order that an inexible rm be always better o producing and selling q = x than
shutting down, we will assume that:
13
  2x+ s [which implies that   2x+ s].
Hence, an inexible rm will produce and sell the quantity q = x (its reaction function
is constant at x).
capacity giving the minimum average cost of production in stage 2. With x exogenous, exibility may be
protable even without variability in demand because the exible technology allows a lower production
cost ex post for production levels away from x.
13
Suppose rm 1 is inexible and rm 2 is exible; then (recall that c = s) q
2
(q
1
) =
1
2
(  s   q
1
) and
rm 1 will prefer to produce at capacity if in such a case the equilibrium price is above s rather than not
produce and realize zero prots. Producing and selling at capacity x means a price of p =
1
2
(+ s  x)
which is larger than s if  > x+ s, in which case q
2
(x) > 0. If both rms are inexible, then producing
and selling at capacity means a price of p =   2x which is larger that s if  > 2x+ s. If both rms are
exible, then the Cournot equilibrium price with both rms producing will be p =
1
3
+
2
3
s which is larger
than s if  > s; hence our assumption. Moreover, the assumption on  simplies the analysis insofar as it
implies that for any realization of demand (), there is a unique Cournot Nash Equilibrium in stage 2 in
which both rms produce.
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This model representation will allow us to characterize in a relatively explicit way the
strategic value of technological exibility choices. The structure of the model is such that
the solution of the competition game between the two rms can be obtained by solving
rst for the production choices of the rms given their respective technological choices,
and then for the technological choices given their respective optimal production decision
functions. We are therefore looking for a subgame perfect Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium
in technological adoption as a function of the following six industry parameters:
, the average or expected size of the market
V , (or ), the variability or volatility in the level of demand
H, the dierential investment cost for a exible technology
, the slope of the demand function
x, the average cost minimizing level of production
s, the minimum level of average variable production cost for an inexible technology
which is equal, by assumption, to the constant marginal cost of production c for a
exible technology.
3. The Best Reply Functions at the Technological Choice Stage
We rst characterize the second stage production equilibria given the technological
choices made at the rst stage and then characterize the best responses at the techno-
logical choice stage.
3.1 The Expected Prots given the Outcome of the Technological Choice Stage
Since the exibility variable  can take only two values, namely f and i, we must base
our analysis on the explicit consideration of the four possible technological congurations
which may arise at the end of the rst stage of the game. Under our assumption on ,
we can characterize the equilibrium at stage 2 by assuming that an inexible rm does
11
produce and sell at capacity and that the competitor, if exible, reacts optimally to it.
It is in that sense and case that commitment, under inexibility, is said to be `maximal'.
Suppose that at the end of stage 1, the technological choices results in (i; f), that is
one rm inexible and the other exible. The exible rm's prot function is given by

f
(; i; f) = [  s  (q
i
+ q
f
)]q
f
 H (3.1)
and the best response of the exible rm is:
q
f
(q
i
) =
1
2
(  s  q
i
): (3.2)
The inexible rm will produce and sell in stage 2 the quantity q
i
= x. Hence the second
stage equilibrium is
(q
i
; q
f
) = (x;
1
2
(  s  x)): (3.3)
Substituting these values in the prot functions (3:1) and denoting by E

(
0
; 
00
),
 2 f
0
; 
00
g, the expected prot of the rm with technology  when the technological
choices are (
0
; 
00
), we get the reduced form prot functions:
E
f
(i; f) =
1
4
[V + (   s  x)
2
] H (3.4)
E
i
(i; f) =
1
2
x(  s  x) (3.5)
Note that we can express x as
x =
1
3
(  s) + ; (3.6)
that is to say the Cournot equilibrium quantity
1
3
(   s) when both rms are exible
and  is equal to its expected value , plus some discrepancy term denoted by  which
may be either positive or negative according to the value of x. From the assumption on
, we must have
1
6
(  s)   so that:
   
1
3
(  s)   
1
6
(  s)  : (3.7)
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Substituting x given by (3:6) into (3:4) and (3:5), we get:
E
f
(i; f) =
1
9
(   s)
2
+
1
4
V  
1
3
(  s) +
1
4

2
 H (3:4
0
)
E
i
(i; f) =
1
9
(   s)
2
+
1
6
(  s) 
1
2

2
(3:5
0
)
where
1
9
(   s)
2
is the prot per rm (over variable costs) at the Cournot equilibrium
when both rms are exible and  is equal to its expected value .
Suppose that at the end of stage 1, the technological conguration is (i; i), that is
both rms are inexible. Then both rms will produce and sell quantity q = x for all
values of  and we obtain
E
i
(i; i) = x(  s  2x); (3.8)
that is, adopting the representation (3:6) for x:
E
i
(i; i) =
1
9
(   s)
2
 
1
3
(  s)  2
2
: (3:8
0
)
Suppose nally that at the end of stage 1, the technological conguration is (f; f),
that is both rms are exible. Then the second stage Cournot equilibrium will be
the standard Cournot equilibrium with linear demand and constant marginal cost of
production, that is q
f
=
1
3
(  s). Therefore
E
f
(f; f) =
1
9
(  s)
2
+
1
9
V  H: (3.9)
We can now go back to the technological choice stage and characterize the best
response function BR() of a rm to dierent choices of technological exibility by the
other.
3.2 The Best Response to Inexibility
Suppose rst that a rm has chosen an inexible technology. Under our assumption
on , both E
f
(i; f) and E
i
(i; i) are positive and therefore a rm will never decide as
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a best response to stay out of the market. It is evident that exibility is for the other
rm a best response i E
f
(i; f)  E
i
(i; i), that is to say, from (3:4) and (3:8), i
f = BR(i) ()
1
4
[V + (   s  3x)
2
] H  0: (3.10)
or equivalently from (3:4
0
) and (3:8
0
), i
f = BR(i) ()
1
4
V +
9
4

2
 H  0: (3:10
0
)
The rst term of the above inequality (3:10
0
) depends on the volatility of the market
whereas the second term is an increasing function of the absolute value of , the gap
(either positive or negative) between the Cournot equilibrium production level, when
both rms are exible and the size of the market is equal to its average size, and the
capacity production level x. If the capacity production level x is equal to
1
3
(  s) and
the volatility of the market size V is equal to 0, then as far as the prot over variable costs
is concerned, it would make no dierence to adopt a exible technology or an inexible
one. If the exogenous capacity x is equal to
1
3
(  s), i.e. if  = 0, then the best second
stage production level with a exible technology is equal to
1
3
(   s), the production
level at which an inexible rm would be committed, so that the exible technology and
the inexible one are equivalent. As the volatility of the market increases, the exible
technology becomes relatively more protable since it allows a ner tuning of the second
stage production level. The term
1
4
V is the gain coming from this more adapted response
when the market size is uctuating around its average value. If the capacity level x is
either higher or lower than the Cournot quantity without uncertainty
1
3
(   s), then
the best response to x is, for a exible rm, equal to [
1
2
(   s)  
1
2
x] so that the gap
between this best response and the capacity commitment level amounts to:
x 

1
2
(  s) 
1
2
x

=

1
3
(   s) + 

 

1
2
(   s) 
1
2

1
3
(   s) + 

=
3
2
:
Hence, except when x =
1
3
(  s), i.e. when  = 0, inexibility is never a best response
to inexibility when the dierential xed cost is neglected.
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Noting that by assumption  > s + 2x, we may characterize the conditions under
which exibility is a best response to inexibility as follows:
Proposition 1: Flexibility is a best response to inexibility, f = BR(i), when the sum of
the volatility eect
1
4
V , permitted by a better adjustment with a exible technology, and
the capacity eect
9
4

2
, which are both positive, is larger than the dierential xed cost
H, a condition which is more likely satised:
- the larger the variance of the market size V is,
- the further (smaller or larger) the expected size of the market  is from 3x+ s,
- the further the capacity production level x of an inexible technology is from
1
3
( s),
- the smaller the dierential cost H of the exible technology is [for H = 0, exibility
is always a better response to inexibility than inexibility],
- the further the average variable cost s is from   3x,
- either the further the absolute value of the slope of the inverse demand function  is
from
1
3x
(  s) +
1
9
2
(2H) when H 
3
4
(  s)x, or the smaller the absolute value of
the slope of the inverse demand function  is when H 
3
4
(   s)x. k
Proof: The proposition follows directly from (3:10
0
) and its equivalent (3:10), where the
sum of the terms in  is minimized at  = s+3x, the sum of the terms in x is minimized
at x =
1
3
(   s), the sum of the terms in s is minimized at s =    3x, and the sum
of the terms in  is minimized at  =
1
3x
(  s) +
1
9
2
(2H). QED
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3.2 The Best Response to Flexibility
Suppose now that a rm has chosen a exible technology. Then exibility is a best
response to exibility i E
f
(f; f)  E
i
(f; i), that is to say, from (3:5) and (3:9),
f = BR(f) ()
1
9
[V + (   2s 
9
2
x) +
1
2
(3x+ 2s)(3x+ s)] H  0: (3.11)
or equivalently from (3:5
0
) and (3:9),
f = BR(f) ()
1
9
V +
1
2

2
 
1
6
(  s) H  0: (3:11
0
)
Again the dierence in prots permitted by adopting a exible technology rather than
an inexible one can be split into two terms. The rst term,
1
9
V , comes from a better
adaptability to changing market conditions given a xed expected size of the market .
The second one,
1
2

2
 
1
6
( s), is shown below to come from the gap (either positive or
negative) between the capacity production level x and the production level of the leader
in a Stackelberg production game where both rms are exible and the market volatility
is zero. Let us denote by Z() this second term; we get:
@Z
@
= 0 if  =
1
6
(   s)
and
@
2
Z
@
2
=  > 0: Hence Z() is minimized at  =
1
6
(   s) [which by (3:7) is the
upper bound of the admissible values] where its value is negative. But  =
1
6
(   s) is
equivalent to x =
1
2
( s), that is the leader's production level is the second stage when
both rms are exible and the market volatility is zero. So suppose that x =
1
2
(   s),
then it is clearly better to be inexible than exible since adopting a exible technology
would drive the rms to the Cournot equilibrium in the production subgame, which is
evidently less protable than the Stackelberg equilibrium for the leader. Hence, the pure
capacity eect is working against exibility as long as x 2
 
1
3
(  s);
1
2
(  s)

. When
x is equal to
1
3
(   s), that is when  = 0, and volatility is zero, both the exible
technology and the inexible technology generate the same prots over variable costs.
When x <
1
3
(   s) the picture is reversed: the commitment value of production level
x is too low and it would be better to be exible rather than inexible.
Since by assumption x <
1
2
(   s) we can conclude as follows:
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Proposition 2: Flexibility is a best response to exibility, f = BR(f), when the sum of
the volatility eect
1
9
V , permitted by a better second stage adjustment with a exible
technology, and the capacity eect
1
2

2
 
1
6
(   s) which is either positive, if x <
1
3
(  s), or negative, if
1
3
(   s) < x <
1
2
(   s), is larger than the dierential xed
cost H, a condition which is more likely satised:
- the larger the variance of the market size V is,
- the further (either smaller or larger) the expected size of the market  is from
9
4
x+s,
- the smaller the capacity production level x of an inexible technology is,
- the smaller the dierential cost H of the exible technology is,
- the further the average variable cost s is from  
9
4
x,
- the smaller the absolute value of the slope of the inverse demand function  is. k
Proof: The proposition follows directly from (3:11
0
) and its equivalent (3:11), where the
sum of the terms in  is minimized at  =
9
4
x+s, the sum of the terms in x is minimized
at x =
1
2
(   s), the sum of the terms in s is minimized at s =   
9
4
x, and the sum
of the terms in  is minimized at  =
1
2x
(  s) +
1
x
2
H. QED
From the best responses, we can characterize the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in
technological exibility (
1
; 
2
).
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4. Simultaneous and Sequential Move Technological Equilibria
4.1 Simultaneous Move Equilibria
Suppose that the rms move simultaneously in the technology choice stage.
Proposition 3: The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game where at the technology
choice stage both rms move simultaneously, can be characterized as follows:
(a) both rms choose inexible technologies if inexibility is the best response to both
inexibility and exibility [inexibility is a dominant strategy], that is if neither
(3:10) [or equivalently (3:10
0
)] nor (3:11) [or equivalently (3:11
0
)] are satised {
domain I in Figure 1 (where  =
p
V ) and in Figure 1
0
;
(b) both rms choose exible technologies if exibility is the best response to both
inexibility and exibility [exibility is a dominant strategy], that is if (3:10)
[(3:10
0
)] and (3:11) [(3:11
0
)] are satised { domain II in Figure 1 and in Figure 1
0
;
(c) one rm chooses the exible technology and the other the inexible technology if
inexibility is the best response to exibility and exibility is the best response to
inexibility, that is if (3:10) [(3:10
0
)] is satised but not (3:11) [(3:11
0
)] { domain
III in Figure 1 and in Figure 1
0
;
(d) both rms choose the same technology, either exible or inexible, if inexibility
is the best response to inexibility and exibility is the best response to exibility,
that is if (3:10) [(3:10
0
)] is not satised but (3:11) [(3:11
0
)] is { domain IV in
Figure 1 and in Figure 1
0
. k
Proposition 3 shows that exible and inexible rms may very well coexist in a
Nash equilibrium. This will be the case if the dierential investment cost H of exible
technologies is neither too small nor too large, in which case one rm adopts a exible
technology and the other an inexible one. We will see later that the most protable
technology is not always the same. This clearly means that observing the coexistence of
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FMS technologies and traditional ones is not peculiar; there are no compelling reasons
why the equilibrium should be symmetric. We gave evidence above that American rms
are investing signicantly less in FMS than their Japanese counterparts. What we have
so far established is that such an asymmetric conguration is not incompatible with
choices made by rational or competent rms in a strategic environment. What remains
surprising though is that Japanese rms are adopting the FMS technologies more often.
We will go one step further in understanding that situation by looking at the Stackelberg
equilibria in long run technological exibility choices.
4.2 Sequential Move Equilibria
Suppose that the rms move sequentially in the technology choice stage.
14
Let us
characterize the optimal technological choice of the rst-mover rm. To achieve that, we
must compare the leader's prot for each choice of  2 fi; fg given that the second-mover
will react according to its best response characterized in Propositions 1 and 2. The only
tricky case is the case where no technological choice is a dominant strategy.
When inexibility is a dominant strategy, that is when neither (3:10) [(3:10
0
)] nor
(3:11) [(3:11
0
)] are satised, then clearly both the rst-mover and the second-mover choose
the inexible technology. When exibility is a dominant strategy, that is when both
(3:10) [(3:10
0
)] and (3:11) [(3:11
0
)] are satised, then clearly both the rst-mover and the
second-mover choose the exible technology.
When inexibility is the best response to exibility, i = BR(f), whereas exibility
is the best response to inexibility, f = BR(i), the rst-mover must compare E
i
(i; f),
which he gets when choosing an inexible technology, to E
f
(f; i), which he gets when
choosing a exible technology.
14
A Stackelberg equilibrium is a reasonable equilibrium concept for long run decisions. Moreover, although
the endogenous emergence of a leader-follower market structure is not modeled here, it should be understood
that such a structure may very well have emerged from a previous stage even if rms were in a completely
symmetric and similar position at the beginning of that previous stage. See Daughety and Reinganum
(1990) for one such model. See also Boyer and Moreaux (1987) for a model in which rms do not compete
for leadership or followership but indeed agree on a distribution of roles.
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Hence, from (3:4) and (3:5), he will choose a exible technology i:
15
1
4
[V + (  s  x)
2
] 
1
2
x(  s  x) H  0 (4.1)
that is, from (3:4
0
) and (3:5
0
), i:
1
4
V  
1
2
(  s) +
3
4

2
 H  0; (4:1
0
)
When inexibility is the best response to inexibility, i = BR(i), whereas exibility
is the best response to exibility, f = BR(f), the rst-mover must compare E
i
(i; i),
which he gets when choosing an inexible technology, to E
f
(f; f), which he gets when
choosing a exible technology. Hence, from (3:8) and (3:9), he will choose a exible
technology i:
16
1
9
[V + (  s)
2
]  x(  s  2x) H  0 (4.2)
that is, using (3:8
0
), i:
1
9
V +
1
3
(  s) + 2
2
 H  0: (4:2
0
)
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The conditions (4:1) and (4:1
0
) are more likely to be satised:
{ the larger the variance of the market size V is,
{ the larger the expected size of the market  is [the function W (V; ; x; s; ;H) dened by (4:1) is increasing
in  in the region of interest],
{ the larger  is when it is larger than the Cournot quantity
1
3
(   s) [the function (V; ;H) dened by
(4:1
0
) is increasing in  if  >
1
3
(  s)]
{ the smaller the capacity production level x of an inexible technology is [the function W (V; ; x; s; ;H)
dened by (4:1) is decreasing in x in the region of interest],
{ the smaller the dierential cost H of the exible technology is,
{ the smaller the absolute value of the slope of the inverse demand function  is [the function W (V; ; x; s; ;H)
dened by (4:1) is decreasing in  in the region of interest].
16
The conditions (4:2) and (4:2
0
) are more likely to be satised:
{ the larger the variance of the market size V is,
{ the larger [smaller] the expected size of the market  is when  is larger [smaller] than
9
2
x+ s,
{ the smaller the capacity production level x of an inexible technology is when x >
1
4
(  s),
{ the smaller the dierential cost H of the exible technology is,
{ the larger the absolute value of the slope of the inverse demand function  is when  >
1
4x
2
(H + x(+ s).
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Lemma 1: If i = BR(i) and f = BR(f), then E
i
(i; i) > E
f
(f; f). k
Proof: We must show that if (3:11) is met but not (3:10) [domain IV in the gures],
then (4:2) is not met and the leader always choose an inexible technology. We have
i = BR(i) and f = BR(f) if
4H   (  s  3x)
2
> 9H   (m  2s 
9
2
x) 
1
2
(3x+ 2s)(3x+ s)
which holds i
 5H +
3
2
x(  s  3x)  0 (`:1)
which holds only if (   s   3x)  0: Now, (4:2) fails to be satised when i = BR(i)
and f = BR(f) if
4H   (  s  3x)
2
< 9H + 9x(m  s  2x)  (  s)
2
which holds i
5H + 3x(  s  3x)  0: (`:2)
Clearly, `:1 implies `:2. QED.
We may conclude as follows, denoting by E
L
(; 
0
) and E
F
(; 
0
) the expected
prots of the rst-mover (leader) and of the second-mover (follower) when the leader
chooses a technology  and the follower a technology 
0
:
Proposition 4: The subgame perfect Stackelberg equilibrium (
L
; 
F
) can be character-
ized as follows:
(a) both rms choose inexibility and their expected prots are similar either if inex-
ibility is a best response to both exibility and inexibility, that is if neither (3:10)
[(3:10
0
)] nor (3:11) [(3:11
0
)] hold { domain I in Figure 1 and in Figure 1
0
{ or if
inexibility is the best response to inexibility, exibility is the best response to
exibility and E
L
(i; i) > E
L
(f; f), that is if (3:11) [(3:11
0
)] holds but neither
(3:10) [(3:11
0
)] nor (4:2) [(4:2
0
)] { domain IV Figure 1 and in Figure 1
0
;
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(b) both rms choose exibility and their expected prots the similar if exibility is
a best response to both exibility and inexibility, that is if both (3:10) [(3:10
0
)]
and (3:11) [(3:11
0
)] hold { domain II in Figure 1 and in Figure 1
0
;
(c) the rst-mover will be exible and the second-mover inexible if inexibility is
the best response to exibility, exibility is the best response to inexibility and
E
L
(f; i) > E
L
(i; f), that is if (3:10) [(3:10
0
)] and (4:1) [(4:1
0
)] hold but not
(3:11) [(3:11
0
)] { domain III.A in Figure 1 and in Figure 1
0
; rst-movership is
the preferred position;
(d) the rst-mover will be inexible and the second-mover exible if inexibility is
the best response to exibility, exibility is the best response to inexibility and
E
L
(f; i) < E
L
(i; f), that is if (3:10) [(3:10
0
)] holds but neither (3:11) [(3:11
0
)]
nor (4:1) [(4:1
0
)] { domain III.B in Figure 1 and in Figure 1
0
; rst-movership is
the preferred position. k
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We immediately have the following corollaries.
Corollary 1: The expected prots of the rst-mover are never lower than the expected prof-
its of the second-mover, whatever the equilibrium conguration of technologies. Hence,
technological exibility choices are strategic substitutes rather than complements. k
Consider Figure 1 and Figure 1
0
. The Nash equilibria and the Stackelberg equilibria are
the same in domains I and II; in III and IV, there are two Nash equilibria, f(i; f); (f; i)g
in III, f(i; i); (f; f)g in IV, but only one Stackelberg equilibrium, the one most favorable
to the rst-mover, that is (i; f) in III.B, (f; i) in III.A, and (i; i) in IV. Hence:
17
It may be informative to restate Proposition 4 in a dierent way as follows:
(a) if f = BR(f) and f = BR(i), then (
L
; 
F
) = (f;f)
(b) if i = BR(f) and i = BR(i), then (
L
; 
F
) = (i; i)
(c) if i = BR(f) and f = BR(i), then (
L
; 
F
) =

(f; i) if (4:1) is satised
(i; f) otherwise
(d) if f = BR(f) and i = BR(i), then (
L
; 
F
) = (i; i):
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Corollary 2: A exibility trap is present in industries represented in domain IV. Although
(f; f) is a legitimate Nash equilibrium, both rms would make more prots if they were
to choose inexible technologies (i; i). k
It is interesting and revealing to see how the predicted Stackelberg equilibrium
evolves as the volatility and the (expected) size of the market change. The following
two corollaries give two particular \paths of technological exibility adoptions".
Corollary 3: Suppose that the expected size of the market is xed at ^ in Figure 1; then,
as the volatility of demand  increases, we obtain the following sequence of predicted
equilibria (
L
; 
F
): (i; i), (i; f), (f; i), (f; f). Hence for intermediate values of demand
volatility, an increase in volatility induces the two rms to \trade" their technologies: the
inexible leader switches to a exible technology inducing the follower to switch from an
inexible technology to a exible one. k
Corollary 4: Suppose that the volatility of demand is xed at ^ in Figure 1; then, as the
expected size of the market  increases, we obtain the following sequence of equilibria
(
L
; 
F
): (i; f), (i; i), (f; i), (f; f). Again the two rms may wish to \trade" their
technologies but through a stage in which both rms choose inexible technologies. k
To represent dierent industries directly on Figure 1 as points in (; )-space, we
must normalize the measurement of  and . To do so, we can normalize the production
levels q in terms of x and  by rewriting the demand function in a given industry as:
p^ =
p
x
=

x
  
q
L
+ q
F
x
= ^  (q^
L
+ q^
F
):
In this way,  and x can be said to be normalized to 1. We obtain E(^) = E()=x
and (^) = ()=x. Hence, changes in  or x in a particular industry move the point
representing it, in the (; )-space, on the ray from the origin through the original point:
away from the origin if x decreases and towards the origin if x increases. Those changes
have no eect on the boundaries of the dierent domains in Figure 1.
Let us consider three changes typically associated with the emergence of exible
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technologies: a reduction in the dierential cost of exibility H, a reduction in the
minimum eciency scale x and a reduction in . The last two changes represent increases
in competitive pressures: the reduction in  implies an increase in demand elasticity at all
production levels
18
while the reduction in x may be interpreted as softer entry conditions
and therefore more aggressive competition from the competitive fringe for our duopolists.
Corollary 5: If the competitive pressures increase in an industry, either through an
increase in the price elasticity of demand or through a reduction of the minimum eciency
scale of production, then
{ for industries in I close to the border of III.A, one would predict a switch from (i; i)
to (i; f), that is an increase in overall exibility because of the second-mover's switch
to a exible technology;
{ for industries in I close to the border of III.B, one would predict a switch form (i; i)
to (f; i), that is an increase in overall exibility due to the rst-mover's switch to a
exible technology;
{ for industries in III.A close to the border of III.B one would predict a switch from
(i; f) to (f; i), that is would see the rst-mover and the second-mover `trade' their
technologies !
{ for industries in III.B close to the border of IV, one would predict a switch form (f; i)
to (f; f), that is an increase in overall exibility due to the second-mover's switch to
a exible technology;
{ for industries `located' in I close to the border of II, one would predict a switch from
(i; i) to (f; f), that is an increase in overall exibility because of a switch by both rms
to a exible technology. k
The following corollary on the impact of a reduction in the dierential investment cost
18
But of course the demand elasticity at every price level remains the same.
24
H of exible technologies is expressed in terms of the distribution of industries in the
(; )-space. A change in H has no eect on the distribution of industries in (; )-
space but displaces the boundaries of the dierent domains. If H decreases by dH, then
all the boundaries in Figure 1 moves down vertically: (4:1) and (3:10) by 4dH, and
(3:11) by 9dH. Suppose that the normalized minimum value of  is above the value
for which (3:10) intersects with the horizontal axis, say   2:8. Then a reduction in
the dierential investment cost H of exible technologies increases domain II, reduces
domains I and III.A but has no eect on domain III.B. Hence:
Corollary 6: A reduction in the dierential investment cost H of exible technologies
unambiguously reduces the probability of observing conguration (i; i) and increases the
probability of observing conguration (f; f). Although the overall eect is favorable to
the adoption of exible technologies, the specic eect on the probabilities of observing
asymmetric equilibria (f; i) and (i; f) depends on the distribution of industries in (; )-
space [assuming that the distribution is uniform over [(2:8; 0); (; )] for the parameter
values of Figure 1, then a reduction in H would not change the probability of observing
conguration (i; f) but would reduce the probability of observing conguration (f; i), hence
an increase in the probability of (i; f) relative to (f; i) !]. k
5. Technological Flexibility and Entry Deterrence
Technological choices may be aimed at preventing entry. We will characterize in
this section the circumstances under which the rst mover may switch to a more (less)
exible technology in order to prevent entry and those under which technology cannot
be used to prevent entry. Suppose that there exists a sunk cost of entry K independent
of the investment cost of the technology that the entrant will eventually choose. We will
continue to assume that H(i) = 0 and H(f) = H > 0.
We must rst characterize the level of prots a rm would obtain if it were able to
blockade entry and act as a monopolist.
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Proposition 5: The optimal technology choice of a monopolist can be characterized as
follows:

M
= f if
1
4
[V + (  s)
2
]  x(  s  x) H  0

M
= i otherwise k
Proof: If  = i, then the monopolist inelastically put on the market the quantity
q = v = x and his prot is
E
M
(i) = E[(  x)x  sx] = x(  s  x): (5.1)
If  = f , then the monopolist puts on the market the quantity q() =
1
2
(   s) and
realizes an expected prot of
E
M
(f) = E[
 
  s  q()

q()] H =
1
4
[V + (   s)
2
] H: (5.2)
The proposition follows from comparing the prot levels. QED.
We can use (5:1), (5:2), the prot functions derived in section 3, and proposition 4
above to obtain the following propositions. In each case, the leader will consider switching
from , the exible (inexible) technology, to 
0
, the inexible (exible) one, to enjoy
monopoly prots when doing so can prevent entry, that is when K and E
F
(; ) satisfy
the following two conditions, with  6= 
0
:
E
F
(
0
; BR(
0
)) < E
F
(;BR()) (5.3)
K  E
F
(
0
; BR(
0
)); (5.4)
that is when the entrant's prot decreases with the switch by the incumbent from  to

0
and the entry cost K is at a proper level. By assumption, K < E
F
(;BR()), that
is the original choice of the incumbent would not prevent entry.
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Proposition 6: When f = BR(f) and f = BR(i) [domain II in Figure 1], the leader
chooses a exible technology; he will switch to an inexible one if
V  9H   (  s)
2
+ 9x(  s  x) (5.5)
V   (  s)
2
+
18
5
x(   s) 
9
5

2
x
2
(5.6)
provided that K is at an appropriate level. k
Proof: The leader would consider switching to an inexible technology if E
M
(i) >
E
L
(f; f) which is condition (5:5) and if E
F
(i; f) < E
F
(f; f) which is condition
(5:6). Hence if those conditions are satised, the leader will switch to an inexible
technology provided that K satises (5:4). QED.
Conditions (5:5) and (5:6) dene the kj-subdomain in domain II in Figure 1; (5:6) does not
appear because it is way above (5:5) on the graph. This subdomain represents industries
in which a leader (or incumbent) will choose an entry preventing inexible technology, if
the entry cost K is at an appropriate level, rather than the exible technology he would
choose otherwise.
Proposition 7: When i = BR(f) and f = BR(i) [domain III in Figure 2], the leader will
never operate a switch in his technology because doing so cannot prevent entry. k
Proof: If the leader has chosen a exible technology, then it must be the case that
E
L
(f; i) > E
L
(i; f); but recall that E
L
(f; i) = E
F
(i; f) and that E
L
(i; f) =
E
F
(f; i); hence it is impossible for the leader to prevent entry since E
L
(f; i) >
E
L
(i; f) implies E
F
(i; f) > E
F
(f; i). And similarly for the case where the leader
has chosen an inexible technology. QED.
Hence in those industries characterized by a (; ) in domain III, a change in technological
exibility, either from f to i or from i to f , cannot prevent entry.
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Proposition 8: When i = BR(f) and i = BR(i) [domain I in Figure 2], the leader
chooses an inexible technology; he would switch to a exible technology if
V > 4H   (  s)
2
+ 2x[  s  2x] (5.7)
  3x+ s (5.8)
provided that K is at an appropriate level. k
Proof: Condition (5:7) is the condition under which E
M
(f) > E
L
(i; i) and condition
(5:8) is the condition under which E
F
(f; i) < E
F
(i; i); therefore if those conditions
hold, the leader will switch to exibility provided that K satises (5:4). QED.
Note that condition (5:7) and (5:8) dene the -subdomain in domain I of Figure 2; this
subdomain represents industries in which a leader (or incumbent) will choose an entry
preventing exible technology, if the entry cost K is at an appropriate level, rather than
the inexible technology he would choose otherwise.
6. Conclusion
Most studies of technological exibility concentrate on the minimization of costs
in a decision-theoretic context. We have shown in this paper that those choices have
important strategic implications which depend on market structure. More precisely, we
have shown how technological exibility choices and equilibrium (both simultaneous and
sequential) congurations in dierent industries depend on the (six) characteristics of
the industry and on the strategic positioning of the rms and how changes in those
characteristics are likely to aect the technological exibility conguration observed in
a given industry and therefore the distribution of those exibility congurations in the
economy as a whole. Flexible and inexible technologies can coexist in an industry when
the normalized expected or average value  and the normalized variance or standard
error  of market size fall in a particular region of the parameter space [domain III in
Figure 1, 1
0
and 2] which we characterized. Low market volatility, V or , combined
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with intermediate market size  will favor inexible technologies; large values of either 
or  will favor exible technologies; low values of both  and  and intermediate values
of both  and  will favor asymmetric choices of technological exibilities. There is a
possibility of exibility trap in industries characterized by low volatility and intermediate
to large market size. Finally, inexible technologies can be part of an entry preventing
strategy in some industries while exible technologies will be in other industries.
Our results not only shed light on the underlying factors explaining the `stylized
fact' described in the introduction, namely that Japan invests signicantly more in FMS
technologies than the United States, but also suggest explicit empirical hypotheses to be
tested with time series data on an industry or with cross sectional data on a set of in-
dustries. Those empirical hypotheses characterize the impact of variations in the relative
investment costs of exible and inexible technologies, in market size, in demand volatil-
ity and in competitive market pressures on the equilibrium conguration (or adoption
path) of exible technologies in dierent industries. Although many of those impacts
might conrm one's prior expectations, a signicant subset are rather surprising: rms
may wish to \trade" their technologies, the increase in exibility may come sometimes
from the leader rm and sometimes from the follower rm, increases in market size may
favor inexible technologies, rms in an industry may nd themselves in an `excessive
liquidity' trap, exible technologies may be used to prevent entry, etc. Hence, some
prudence is required in predicting the emergence (and adoption) of technological ex-
ibility positions by rms: decision-theoretic contexts dier signicantly form strategic
equilibrium contexts.
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